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LIST OF PARTIES 
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accordingly. (R. 1294-1300.) The dismissal of the claims against Schneider Electric is 
not at issue in this appeal. 
All other parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are listed in the case 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Notice of Appeal filed by Appellants Ginger Gardner, Sabrina Lynn Gardner, 
Heather Ann Gardner, and Joshua Lee Gardner (collectively the "Gardners," "Plaintiffs," 
or "Appellants") was timely, and this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2010). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant appellee Schneider Canada Inc.'s 
("Schneider Canada") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for Lack 
of Personal Jurisdiction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Gardners correctly note that because the trial 
court made its determination concerning personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada 
based upon affidavits submitted by the parties, this Court reviews the trial court's 
decision for correctness. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, f^ 2, 
8 P.3d 256. However, because the Gardners did not controvert any of the jurisdictional 
facts set forth in the affidavits Schneider Canada submitted below, this Court takes those 
facts as true for purposes of this appeal, and disregards any contradictory facts that may 
be contained in the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint. Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Mack Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
2. Should this Court affirm the dismissal of the Gardners' claims against 
Schneider Canada on the alternative ground that those claims are moot because the jury's 
findings below in their special verdict exonerating SPX Corporation ("SPX") and HOJ 
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Engineering & Sales Co. Inc. ("HOJ"), together with the trial court's judgment on that 
verdict, collaterally estop the Gardners from proving their claims against Schneider 
Canada? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The alternative ground for affirmance—mootness— 
was never before the trial court for consideration and has become apparent only after the 
Gardners framed the issues on appeal. Thus, this Court will necessarily be the first to 
undertake a mootness analysis. Nevertheless, ample authority exists for the proposition 
that an appellate court will not remand claims where further consideration by the trial 
court is futile because the claims are moot. See, e.g., Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 
2003 UT 51, f t 130-137, 82 P.3d 1076 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim on alternative 
ground that jury verdict in trial below had destroyed an essential factual predicate for 
fraud claim, thus rendering claim moot and precluding reversal or remand); see also 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 16, 48 P.3d 968 ("[W]e 
will not adjudicate issues when the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed 
moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting 
Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f 25, 16 P.3d 1233). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISONS ON APPEAL 
The appeal of the district court's decision to dismiss the Fourth Amended 
Complaint against Schneider Canada for lack of personal jurisdiction turns on common 
law principles, the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-201 et seq.), and 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
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Copies of the Long-Arm Statute and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
are attached hereto as Addendum A and Addendum B, respectively. 
The alternative ground upon which this Court can affirm the dismissal of the 
claims against Schneider Canada turns exclusively on common law collateral estoppel 
and mootness principles and does not rest on any particular constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Schneider Canada objects to the Gardners' Statement of the Case (Br. of 
Appellants at 2-9), because it contains characterizations of the evidence and the 
proceedings below that unfairly distort and entirely omit important portions of the trial 
record. Schneider Canada offers the following Statement of the Case, which more 
accurately describes the facts of the case, the record materials considered by the trial 
court, and the proceedings below. 
A, Proceedings Bekw« 
On May 26, 2006, the Gardners filed their Fourth Amended Complaint asserting 
claims for relief against Schneider Canada for negligence (claim 1), strict liability 
(claim 3), failure to warn (claim 4), breach of express and implied warranties (claim 6), 
and punitive damages (claim 7), as well as additional claims against the other defendants. 
(R. 889-900.) In this action, the Gardners allege that their decedent, Aaron Gardner, was 
fatally injured by a dock leveler at dock door number 51 of the Sysco West Jordan 
facility. (R. 891.) The Gardners allege the dock leveler was a Serco Dock Leveler that 
defendant SPX designed, manufactured, and sold, and defendant HOJ installed. (Id.) 
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The Gardners filed their Fourth Amended Complaint naming Schneider Canada as 
a defendant after SPX identified Schneider Canada as a party it alleged was at fault for 
the accident. (R. 892.) According to SPX, Schneider Canada was at fault because it 
allegedly sold to SPX a defective control panel, which SPX installed in the final product 
that was sold, distributed, and installed at dock door number 51 of the Sysco West Jordan 
facility. (R. 892.) 
On July 31, 2006, Schneider Canada entered a special appearance and moved to 
dismiss the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
(R. 956-986.) Schneider Canada brought its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that it is a 
Canadian corporation with no place of business and no other significant presence in the 
state of Utah. (R. 957-58.) Schneider Canada argued it was not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the trial court because, "[w]hile Schneider Canada designed and 
manufactured a component part of the subject dock door leveler—specifically, the control 
box placed in the subject dock door leveler—the marketing, design, manufacture, 
construction, distribution and sale of the component control box occurred entirely in 
Canada" {Id.; emphasis in original.) Schneider Canada supported its Motion to Dismiss 
with affidavits from Schneider Canada employee Jerold Blake Cross. (R. 959-962, 975-
982.) 
On August 24, 2006, the Gardners filed an opposition to Schneider Canada's 
Motion to Dismiss, in which they made essentially the same arguments they make on this 
appeal: (1) that Schneider Canada had sufficient contacts with Utah simply by placing the 
control box in the "national stream of commerce," and (2) that exercising personal 
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jurisdiction over Schneider Canada would not offend traditional notions of substantial 
justice and fair play because Schneider Canada, as an alleged "billion dollar corporation 
with global reach/5 should expect to be haled into court in Utah. (R. 987-99.) On 
August 31, 2006, SPX filed an opposition to Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss, in 
which it argued personal jurisdiction over Schneider was proper because, SPX alleged, 
Schneider Canada "transacts business in Utah." (R. 1000-1046.) On September 29, 
2006, Schneider Canada filed reply memoranda addressing both the Gardners' and SPX's 
opposition memoranda. (R. 1049-1156.) 
On January 25, 2007, the trial court heard argument on Schneider Canada's 
Motion to Dismiss.1 (R. 1223.) The trial court granted the motion and directed counsel 
for Schneider Canada to prepare an order to that effect. {Id. at pp. 35-36) On April 11, 
2007, the trial court signed and entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting 
Schneider Canada, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for 
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction ("Memorandum Opinion"), which had been approved to 
form by counsel for the Gardners, SPX, and HOJ. (R. 1253-64; 2394-2405.) The 
Memorandum Opinion contained detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
1
 Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. ("Schneider Electric"), which the Gardners added as a 
defendant in their Second Amended Complaint, also moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. (R. 182-218.) On January 25, 2007, the district court heard 
argument and ruled on Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss only, not on Schneider 
Electric's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 2424.) The parties later stipulated to an order 
dismissing the Gardners' Fourth Amended Complaint against Schneider Electric on or 
about April 18, 2007. (R. 1288-1293.) The district court signed and entered the order on 
April 23, 2007. (R. 1294-1300.) Having been dismissed from this action by stipulation, 
Schneider Electric is not a party to this appeal, nor do the Gardners pursue on appeal their 
jurisdictional arguments against Schneider Electric. (See generally Br. of Appellants.) 
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finding Schneider Canada was not subject to either general or specific jurisdiction in the 
state of Utah. A true and correct copy of the trial court's Memorandum Opinion is 
attached as Addendum C. Among other things, the trial court ruled as follows: 
21. Schneider Canada is not conducting substantial 
and continuous local activity in the State of Utah sufficient to 
meet the requirements for this Court to confer general 
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. 
22. With regard to specific jurisdiction, while the 
facts in this case indicate that Schneider Canada's actions 
may fulfill one or some of the enumerated requirements set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (West 2004) ("the Utah 
Long-Arm Statute"), the assertion of jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada does not comport with the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider 
Canada does not have minimum contacts with Utah such that 
the maintenance of the suit against it does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
23. Schneider Canada's actions of manufacturing 
the control box in Canada in accordance to the specifications 
of the Canadian Division of Serco, and selling it to a 
Canadian distributor for ultimate placement in Serco's dock 
levelers is not activity sufficient to show that Schneider 
Canada purposefully availed itself of conducting business in 
the State of Utah. 
24. Mere awareness on the part of Schneider 
Canada that some of the control boxes it manufactured would 
be placed in dock levelers to be sold and used in the United 
States market is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada in the State of Utah. 
25. The actions of Schneider Canada of placing the 
control box into the stream of commerce are not sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada 
26. Schneider Canada's relationship with Square D 
Company, does not establish jurisdiction over Schneider 
Canada. 
4843-9530-7527.2 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27. In light of the above findings, Defendant 
Schneider Canada is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
(R. 1258-59, 2399-2400.) 
After the trial court's ruling dismissing their claims against Schneider Canada for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, the Gardners proceeded with their case against defendants 
SPX and HOJ. A jury trial was held on the Gardners' claims against SPX and HOJ from 
June 8, 2009 to June 16, 2009. (R. 2195-96, 2205, 2217-22, 2255-56, and 2273-74.) On 
June 16, 2009, the jury returned its verdict in which it found that: (1) SPX was not 
negligent in the design of its product; (2) the dock door leveler designed and sold by SPX 
did not contain a design defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (3) 
HOJ was not negligent as alleged by Plaintiffs. (R. 2268-72.) A true and correct copy of 
the jury's special verdict is attached hereto as Addendum D. On August 27, 2009, the 
trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of SPX and HOJ and against 
the Gardners. (R. 2376-2379.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
L Schneider Canada's Marketing, Design, Manufacture, 
Construction, Sale, and Distribution of the Control Box at Issue 
Occurred Entirely in Canada. 
Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada. (R. 959, 976.) Schneider Canada markets, designs, 
manufactures, constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and 
components, and did, in fact, market, design, manufacture, construct, sell, and distribute 
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the control box that was a component part of the dock door leveler that is the subject of 
the underlying litigation. (R. 960, 976) 
Schneider Canada designed the subject control box from specifications provided 
by Serco's2 Canadian division. (Id.) All communications regarding the marketing, 
design, manufacture, construction, and sale of the control box at issue took place between 
and amongst individuals in Canada, including but not limited to representatives of 
Schneider Canada, representatives of Serco's Canadian division, and representatives of a 
London, Ontario, Canada distributor, Guillevin International, Inc. ("Guillevin"). (R. 960, 
981.) 
Schneider Canada sold the subject control box in Canada to Guillevin, (R. 960, 
977.) Guillevin then sold the subject control box in Canada to Serco's Canadian division. 
(Id.) Serco's Canadian division, in turn, sold the control box to its affiliate, SPX, in the 
United States. (R. 960, 803.) 
2. Schneider Canada Never Transacted Business in Utah or 
Purposefully Availed Itself of the Rights and Privileges of 
Conducting Business in Utah. 
At the time of the marketing, design, and manufacture of the subject control box 
and its sale to the Canadian distributor Guillevin, Schneider Canada was not aware that 
the control box would be used in the state of Utah. (R. 961, 981.) Schneider Canada 
does not do business in the state of Utah, is not registered to conduct business in the state 
of Utah, and has not purposely availed itself of the rights and privileges of conducting 
Serco is the predecessor-in-interest to SPX. (R. 957.) 
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business in Utah. (R. 961, 980.) Schneider Canada owns no property in the state of 
Utah, pays no taxes, has no employees, officers, or offices in the state of Utah, and has 
not had any continuous or systematic dealings with the state of Utah. (Id.) None of 
Schneider Canada's shareholders resides in the state of Utah. (Id.) Schneider Canada 
does not maintain telephone or facsimile listings within the state of Utah; nor does it 
advertise in the state of Utah. (Id.) 
Furthermore, Schneider Canada has not conducted any business, communicated, 
or caused communications to occur with any consumer in the state of Utah; nor does a 
substantial percentage of its sales derive from revenue generated from customers in the 
state of Utah. (Id.) Schneider Canada does not render services to any customers in the 
state of Utah. (R. 961, 981.) Schneider Canada has not deliberately or purposefully 
designed, manufactured, constructed, distributed, or sold any product or part in the state 
of Utah; nor has Schneider Canada agreed to design, manufacture, construct, distribute, 
or sell any product in or from the state of Utah. (Id.) 
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3. Schneider Canada's Business Relationship Was With Serco's 
Canadian Division, Not SPX.3 
Contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, ^ 16), Schneider 
Canada, or its predecessor, has had a business relationship with Serco's Canadian 
division, not SPX, for over twenty years. (R. 1051, 1070.) Also contrary to the 
Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, <|fl[ 17, 19), and as stated above, Schneider 
Canada sold hundreds of control panels to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin, not to SPX. 
(R. 1052, 1070.) Schneider Canada constructed and manufactured the control panels to 
Serco's Canadian division's specifications for incorporation into its vertical dock 
levelers. (Id) Schneider Canada worked with employees from Serco's Canadian 
division, not SPX, (Br. of Appellants at 6, f 18), using Serco's design specifications, 
parameters, and schematics to manufacture and produce a control panel for use in Serco's 
vertical dock leveler. Serco's control panel design would change on occasion, and 
Schneider Canada would coordinate with employees from Serco's Canadian division, not 
SPX, to modify the control panels to comply with any changes in the specifications, 
parameters and schematics of Serco's Canadian division. (R. 1052, 1070-71.) 
The next several sections contain facts that directly contradict the Gardners' Statement 
of Facts concerning "Schneider Canada's Contacts and the Schneider Companies." (See 
Br. of Appellants at 6-8.) To the extent there were disputes between Schneider Canada's 
and the Gardners' facts, the trial court properly resolved those disputes in favor of 
Schneider Canada, (see R. 1256-58, 2397-99), and Schneider Canada's facts presented 
herein are entitled to deference on appeal. See Arguello v. Ind. Woodworking Machine 
Co,, 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992) (finding that facts asserted in defendant's affidavit 
are taken as true and the facts in plaintiffs complaint are considered "only to the extent 
that they do not contradict the affidavit"). 
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4, After Selling the Control Boxes to Guillevin, Schneider Canada 
Had No Control Over Where the Control Boxes Were Shipped 
or Installed. 
Contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6, % 20), Schneider 
Canada did not have control over where, when, and to whom the subject control panel 
was sold. (R. 1054, 1070.) To the best of Schneider Canada's knowledge and belief, the 
subject control panel and all others like it manufactured by Schneider Canada were sold 
by a Canadian distributor, Guillevin, to Serco's Canadian division. (Id.) Schneider 
Canada admittedly understood that some of the control panels were or would be installed 
by Serco in vertical dock levelers that would be used in the United States; however, 
Schneider Canada did not have knowledge of the particular states in which those vertical 
dock levelers would be or were installed. (R. 1054, 1071.) Specifically, Schneider 
Canada did not have knowledge of any vertical dock leveler installed in the state of Utah. 
(id.) 
Responding to the Gardners' assertion that Schneider Canada made a sales 
presentation to SPX in Dallas, Texas, (Br. of Appellants at 6, ^ 20), the referenced 
presentation was for a different product than the control panel for the vertical dock 
leveler and was completely unrelated to the control panel for the vertical dock leveler. 
(R. 1054-55, 1071.) Also contrary to the Gardners' assertions, (Br. of Appellants at 6-7, 
1J21), Schneider Canada does not have specific knowledge, nor did it have specific 
knowledge at the time of the sale of the subject control panel, of what proportion of the 
vertical dock levelers manufactured by Serco were installed in the United States. (R. 
1054,1071.) 
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5. Schneider Canada, Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc., and 
Square D Company Are Separate and Distinct Legal Entities, 
The Gardners spend paragraphs 22 through 31 of their Statement of Facts 
attempting to blur the legal distinctions between Schneider Canada, Schneider Electric, 
and Square D Company4 in an attempt to establish that personal jurisdiction over one of 
Schneider Canada's affiliated entities justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada.5 (Br. of Appellants at 7-8, ff 22-31.) The record below, which is 
entitled to deference on this appeal, establishes that the entities are separate and distinct, 
and the relationship between the entities is therefore not relevant to the jurisdictional 
question before this Court. 
Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc. ("Schneider Electric") is a Delaware corporation 
that operates as a holding company and has an ownership interest in Square D Company 
("Square D"). (R. 537, 558.) Schneider Electric does not have any ownership interest in 
Schneider Canada. (Id.) Schneider Electric is a legal entity separate and distinct from 
Square D and Schneider Canada, and is not involved in the day-to-day operations of 
Square D underwent a corporate name change in December 2009, but it was still known 
as Square D at all relevant times. Accordingly, we refer to it as Square D throughout this 
brief. 
The Gardners characterize the three companies as a "global conglomerate" and refer to 
them as the "Schneider Companies," even though neither term is actually used by 
Schneider Canada, Square D, or Schneider Electric. (Br. of Appellants at 7, f 22.) The 
Gardners improperly conflate the three entities, converting their jurisdictional argument 
into an argument for piercing the corporate veil. However, they present no evidence to 
support their stealth argument to pierce the corporate veil, and their attempt to cast the 
three entities as one is therefore improper. Indeed, the record evidence presented herein 
(and to the trial court below) shows that the three entities are separate and distinct and 
that they should be treated as such under the law. 
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either company. (R. 538-558.) Schneider Electric has its own officers and Board of 
Directors; it keeps its own books and accounting records; and it has its own bank 
accounts, separate and distinct from Square D and Schneider Canada. (Id.) 
Square D is a Delaware corporation that markets, designs, manufactures, 
constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and components. (R. 539, 
563-64.) While Square D has an ownership interest in Schneider Canada, it is a legal 
entity separate and distinct from Schneider Electric and Schneider Canada. (R. 539, 
563.). It has its own officers and Board of Directors; it keeps its own books accounting 
records; and it has its own bank accounts separate and distinct from Schneider Electric 
and Schneider Canada. (Id.) It is entirely responsible for meeting its own payroll, 
providing benefits to its own employees, and paying its other business expenses. (Id.) 
As stated above, Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation that markets, 
designs, manufactures, constructs, sells, and distributes a variety of products, parts, and 
components. (R. 959, 976.) Schneider Canada is a legal entity separate and distinct from 
Schneider Electric and Square D and it has own Board of Directors, officers, managers, 
and employees who are responsible for Schneider Canada's day-to-day business 
operations. (R. 540, 564.) 
The fact that Schneider Canada uses the same brands as Square D or Schneider 
Electric, (Br. of Appellants at 7, ff 22, 25, 26), that Schneider Canada's website can be 
accessed through Schneider Electric's website, (see id. at 7, f 27), or that Schneider 
Electric's website turns up the names of distributors and a sales agent in Utah, (see id. at 
8, f 29), is not determinative of the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
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Schneider Canada. Likewise, the fact that Square D has offices in Utah, is registered as a 
corporation in Utah, and has a registered agent in Utah, (Br. of Appellants at 8, TJ 30), is 
not determinative of the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider 
Canada, a subsidiary of Square D. Finally, the fact that one of Square D's other 
subsidiaries, EFI Electronics, was advertising for jobs in Utah, (Br. of Appellants at 8, 
If 31), has no bearing on the jurisdictional question as it relates to Schneider Canada. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction because Schneider Canada is a Canadian corporation with no place 
of business, or any other significant presence, in the state of Utah. Moreover, Schneider 
Canada's marketing, design, manufacture, construction, distribution, and sale of the 
control panel that was a component part of the SPX dock door leveler that allegedly 
caused Aaron Gardner's injury occurred entirely in Canada. Thus, the Gardners cannot 
show that Schneider Canada has minimum contacts with Utah such that maintenance of 
the Gardners' lawsuit against Schneider Canada in Utah does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice 
The Gardners' argument that Schneider Canada is subject to the specific personal 
jurisdiction of a Utah court under a "stream of commerce" theory fails under the 
controlling law and the record evidence. To establish personal jurisdiction under the 
"stream of commerce" theory, the Gardners must show that Schneider Canada took 
deliberate steps specifically to serve the state of Utah with the control panel that was a 
component part of the dock door leveler that is the subject of the underlying lawsuit. 
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Furthermore, Schneider Canada's mere awareness that its product may ultimately be used 
in dock door levelers installed in the United States is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
in the Utah courts under this theory. The Gardners cannot prevail under this theory 
because the record evidence establishes that Schneider Canada did not take any steps 
whatsoever to serve the Utah market such that it could reasonably foresee being haled 
into a Utah court. 
The Gardners' argument that Schneider Canada is subject to the specific personal 
jurisdiction of a Utah court under a "corporate conglomerate" theory also fails as a matter 
of law. In essence, the Gardners argue that Schneider Canada is subject to the 
jurisdiction of Utah courts by virtue of its affiliation with Square D (Schneider Canada's 
parent company) and Schneider Electric (Square D's parent company). However, in 
order to establish an alter-ego relationship for jurisdictional purposes, the Gardners must 
show there exists a unity of interest between Schneider Canada, Square D, and Schneider 
Electric that is so substantial as to warrant the disregard of those entities' corporate 
identities. According to the cases cited in their own brief, the Gardners must show that 
the parent exercises significant control over the subsidiary corporation's day-to-day 
operations and internal affairs, or that the parent is using the subsidiary corporation to 
perpetrate a fraud. The Gardners have made no effort whatsoever to satisfy this veil-
piercing standard, and disregard of Sclineider Canada's corporate identity for 
jurisdictional purposes is therefore improper. 
Finally, even if this Court were to disagree with the trial court's personal 
jurisdiction ruling, the Court should still affirm the dismissal of the claims against 
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Schneider Canada because the jury's disposition of the claims against the other 
defendants below renders the claims against Schneider Canada moot. Thus, remanding 
this matter to the trial court for litigation against Schneider Canada would be futile. This 
Court should affirm the jury verdict, and the judgment below that is based on the verdict, 
for reasons co-appellees SPX and HOJ will explain in their briefs. The jury found that 
SPX's dock door leveler did not contain a design defect that made the product 
unreasonably dangerous. Because Schneider Canada's control panel was simply a 
component part of SPX's dock door leveler, the Gardners are collaterally estopped by the 
jury verdict from pursuing their defective design claims against Schneider Canada. Thus 
their claims against Schneider Canada are moot, and reversing and remanding based on 
the trial court's personal jurisdiction ruling would be futile. If necessary, this Court can 
and should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the claims against Schneider Canada on 
this alternative ground. 
ARGUMENT 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Because the trial court made its decision concerning personal jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada based upon affidavits, an appeal from that decision presents only legal 
questions that are reviewed for correctness. Phone Directories Co,, Inc. v. Henderson, 
2000 UT 64, f 2, 8 P.3d 256 (citing Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mack Co., 838 
P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992)). However, because the Gardners did not controvert 
Schneider Canada's version of the jurisdictional facts in the trial court below, "for 
purposes of this appeal, the facts asserted in [Schneider Canada's] affidavits] are taken 
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as true and the facts recited in the complaint are considered only to the extent that they do 
not contradict the affidavits]." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1121. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT DID NOT HAVE 
JURISDICTION OVER SCHNEIDER CANADA. 
The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting Schneider Canada's 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is generally 
divided into two categories: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Arguello, 
838 P.2d at 1122. The Gardners do not argue on this appeal that the trial court should 
have exercised general jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. Instead, they argue it should 
have exercised specific jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. 
In order to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada, the 
Gardners must show that "(1) the Utah long-arm statute extends to [Schneider Canada's] 
acts or contacts, (2) [the Gardners'] claim arises out of those acts or contacts, and (3) the 
exercise of jurisdiction satisfies [Schneider Canada's] right to due process under the 
United States Constitution." Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth, 2007 UT App 225, f 6, 
164 P.3d 1272 (quoting Fenn v. Meads Enters., Inc., 2006 UT 8, f 8, 137 P.3d 706). As 
the trial court correctly found, the Gardners cannot show that the exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is warranted. 
A. The Gardners Cannot Show that Schneider Canada's Acts or Contacts 
Fall Within the Utah Long-Arm Statute, 
The Gardners fail to present evidence from the record below to establish that 
Schneider Canada falls within the reach of the Utah long-arm statute. The Utah long-arm 
statute provides, in pertinent part: 
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Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who, in person or through an agent, does any of the 
following of the enumerated acts is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or 
related to: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; [or] 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortuous or by breach of warranty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-205.6 The Gardners first argue that Schneider Canada's 
conduct falls within Utah's long-arm statute because the control panel manufactured by 
Schneider Canada "failed and was a cause of Mr. Gardner's death." (Br. of Appellants at 
p. 13.) The Gardners cite to the testimony of Sergeant Nunnelley and their expert, Fred 
Smith, to support this assertion. {Id. at 3-5.) The jury's factual findings, however, 
directly contradict the Gardners' assertion. The jury answered "No" to question number 
three on the special verdict form: "Did Defendant SPX Corporation manufacture and sell 
a product that contained a design defect that made the product unreasonably 
dangerous?" (R. 2269 (emphasis added).) Schneider Canada's control box was only a 
component part of the end product, SPX's dock door leveler. The jury's finding that the 
dock door leveler did not contain a design defect necessarily encompasses all of its 
component parts, including Schneider Canada's control box. Thus, it would be incorrect 
to hold that Schneider Canada is subject to Utah's long-arm statute because its control 
box did not cause the subject injury. 
At the time the trial court made its decision on Schneider Canada's Motion to dismiss in 
2007, the Utah long-arm statute was numbered Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
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The Gardners next contend Schneider Canada's conduct falls within the Utah 
long-arm statute because Schneider Canada "transacted business" in Utah. (Br. of 
Appellants at p. 13.) Because the Gardners cannot show Schneider Canada itself actually 
transacted any business in Utah, they must base their argument on the fact that Schneider 
Canada is "a subsidiary of Square D, amd part of the global Schneider Electric 
conglomerate." (Id) The law is clear, however, that "jurisdiction over a parent 
corporation [Square D] does not automatically establish jurisdiction over a subsidiary 
corporation [Schneider Canada]." Keeton v. Hustier Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 
13 (1984). Thus, as detailed further below in Section 11(B)(2), the fact that Schneider 
Canada is a subsidiary of Square D, which is a subsidiary of Schneider Electric, does not, 
in an of itself, establish personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. 
Because the Gardners cannot establish Schneider Canada engaged in any of the 
acts enumerated by the Utah long-arm statute, the Court's inquiry into the jurisdictional 
question is ended. As explained in the following section, however, even if the Gardners 
were able to satisfy the Utah long-arm statute, they cannot show that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada comports with Schneider Canada's right to 
due process under the Constitution. 
B« Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Schneider Canada Does Not 
Comport with Due Process. 
Although Schneider Canada's activities are outside the reach of the Utah long-arm 
statute, federal due process also precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada. "Due process requires that before a court can exercise specific 
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personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must have had 
'minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Parry v. Ernst Home 
Center Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (citing Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985); InVl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945)). "Further, the defendants' 'conduct and connection with the forum state [must 
be] such that [they] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id 
(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The court 
must examine whether the defendant corporation has "purposefully availed" itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. Id 
In this case, Schneider Canada does not have the required minimum contacts with 
the state of Utah sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Indeed, Schneider Canada's contacts 
with Utah are virtually non-existent and certainly would not allow Schneider Canada 
reasonably to anticipate being haled into court in Utah. As set forth above, Schneider 
Canada is located and operates in Canada. It maintains no offices, owns no property, and 
has no employees in the State of Utah. Moreover, the subject control box in this case— 
which is only a component part of the dock door leveler Serco manufactured—was 
designed, manufactured, and constructed in Canada by Schneider Canada. The control 
box was then sold in Canada to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin. Neither the general 
activities of Schneider Canada (which operates not only outside Utah, but outside the 
United States), nor its specific activities with regard to the subject control box component 
part (which was designed, manufactured and sold not only outside of Utah but outside of 
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the United States) can be considered contacts sufficient enough to hold Schneider Canada 
purposefully availed itself of the laws of Utah. To confer jurisdiction on Schneider 
Canada anywhere in the United States, let alone in Utah, would certainly violate the 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
To support their claim that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider 
Canada comports with the due process requirements of the Constitution, the Gardners 
advance the same arguments the trial court already rejected below. First, the Gardners 
claim the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper under a 
"stream of commerce theory." (Br. of Appellants at 14-20.) Second, the Gardners claim 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper because Schneider 
Canada is part of a global conglomerate of entities, some of which transact business in 
Utah. (Br. of Appellants at 20-23.) As detailed in the following sections, neither of the 
Gardners' arguments warrants the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider 
Canada under the Due Process Clause. 
1. Schneider Canada is not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Merely 
Because It Placed the Control Box Component in the Stream of 
Commerce in Canada. 
The Gardners argue that because Schneider Canada put the control box component 
part into the stream of commerce, it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
courts. This is simply not the case. The "stream of commerce" theory is based on the 
premise that "[o]ne who puts a product into the stream of commerce in such a fashion as 
to reasonably foresee its sale in a certain jurisdiction cannot complain of having to defend 
against claims in that jurisdiction arising out of the product's presence there." Arguello, 
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838 P.2d at 1124. Merely putting the product into the stream of commerce is not 
sufficient; 'the defendant must have taken deliberate steps to serve the forum state 
market with the product that is the subject of the suit before being susceptible to 
jurisdiction in that state." Id. (emphasis added). 
In other words, as articulated by Justice O'Connor in Asahi Metal Industry Co., 
Ltd v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987): 
The placement of a product in to the stream of commerce, 
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the 
defendant may indicate intent or purpose to serve the market 
in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the 
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum state, 
establishing channels for providing regular advice to 
customers in the forum State, or marketing the product 
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent 
in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness that the 
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the 
forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the 
product in to the stream into an act purposefully directed 
toward the forum State. 
Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
In Asahi, the foreign Japanese defendant manufactured a component part (in that 
case, a tire valve) which was then placed into a completed Taiwanese product in Taiwan 
and shipped by the Taiwanese company to California. The Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiff had not demonstrated any action by the Japanese tire valve manufacturer to 
purposefully avail itself of the California market, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Superior Court of California was therefore improper. Id. 
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Here, as in Asahi, Schneider Canada designed and manufactured a component part 
of the Serco dock door leveler—the control box. That component part was designed, 
manufactured, and sold only in Canada to a Canadian distributor. Indeed, all 
communications regarding the design, manufacture, and sale of the control box took 
place entirely in Canada. The control box component part was then sold to Serco in 
Canada, and Serco then brought it into the United States. 
While it is certainly clear that Serco/SPX took deliberate steps to serve the market 
in Utah, the same cannot be said for Schneider Canada, whose activities all occurred in 
Canada. Schneider Canada itself made no effort and took no steps to put the control box 
component part into the stream of commerce in the United States—those steps were all 
taken by Serco's Canadian division after Schneider Canada had sold the part to the 
Canadian distributor. Schneider Canada, like the defendants in AsahU only manufactured 
a component part of a finished complete product that was then distributed by some other, 
unrelated, entity. Schneider Canada cannot be held to have reasonably anticipated being 
haled in to Court in Utah because it sold no control boxes in Utah and did not seek to 
serve the Utah market. See Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1125. Accordingly, jurisdiction cannot 
be conferred over Schneider Canada based on a stream of commerce theory. 
The Gardners go to great lengths to distinguish this case from Parry and Arguello, 
both of which were cases in which the Utah Supreme Court found lack of personal 
jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory. (Br. of Appellants at 18-20.) In order 
to make their distinctions of the two cases work, however, the Gardners must rely on 
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incorrect facts from the record below, and they must ignore key factors upon which the 
Parry and Arguello Courts ruled. 
As to the Gardners' incorrect assertions of fact, the Gardners claim Schneider 
Canada dealt directly with SPX. (Br. of Appellants at 18.)7 The record below, however, 
establishes Schneider Canada sold the control panels to a Canadian distributor, Guillevin, 
which eventually sold them to Serco's Canadian division. Serco's Canadian division 
then distributed them to its United States affiliate, SPX. The Gardners' version of the 
facts incorrectly ignores the channels through which Schneider Canada's control panel 
actually passed. The Court should reject the Gardners' attempt to bolster their stream of 
commerce theory by distorting the record below. 
The Gardners must also ignore important similarities between this case and the 
cases of Parry and Arguello to make their "stream of commerce theory" fit. The 
Gardners claim the Japanese defendants in Parry "claimed they had no knowledge of 
where their mauls would be sold." (Br. of Appellants at 19.) To the contrary, it is clear 
from the Parry opinion itself that the Japanese defendants were informed of sales in the 
Western United States, but "they neither came to Utah nor sent sales representatives to 
Utah to facilitate the marketing and purchase of their product." Parry, 779 P.2d at 666. 
The Gardners also argue Schneider Canada representatives visited Serco in the United 
States (Texas, not Utah), and Schneider Canada does not dispute that. Such visit, 
however, was unrelated to the control panels for the vertical dock levelers. Accordingly, 
and as the Gardners fail to note, Aaron Gardner's injuries could not have arisen out of or 
been related to the Texas contact. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
472 (1985). Moreover, this visit to Texas for an unrelated product does not lead to the 
Gardners' unsupported legal conclusion that Schneider Canada could reasonably expect 
to be sued in Utah. 
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The Parry Court also found important that the Japanese defendants did not "show special 
designing for Utah's market, advertis[e] in Utah, establish[] channels for providing 
regular advice to customers in Utah, or market[] the product through a distributor who 
has agreed to act as a sales agent in Utah." Id, Here, even if it can be alleged that 
Schneider Canada expected that some of its control panels could be used in dock door 
levelers installed in the United States, Schneider Canada, like the Japanese defendants in 
Parry, did not take any active steps to sell or market its product in Utah, and the 
Gardners'stream of commerce theory fails. 
Key similarities between this case and Arguello also preclude specific personal 
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada. The Arguello Court found it important that the out-
of-state defendant "did not seek to serve the Utah market . . . through either sales 
representatives or advertising." Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1125. Moreover, the machine in 
Arguello was sold in California, making it unforeseeable that the machine would be 
resold in Utah. Id. In this case, Schneider Canada likewise did not actively seek to serve 
the Utah market. It did not sell its product directly into the Utah market. Rather, 
Schneider Canada sold its control panels to a Canadian distributor in Canada, who then 
sold the control panels to another Canadian company, who ultimately sold the control 
panels to SPX. Schneider Canada had no control over and could not reasonably foresee 
where its control panels would end up once it sold them to Guillevin, the Canadian 
distributor. 
In sum, there is no meanginful distinction between the case at hand and Parry and 
Arguello. As in Parry and Arguello, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Schneider 
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Canada under a "stream of commerce" theory in this case is improper. Schneider 
Canada's mere awareness that its control panels could be used on dock door levelers in 
the United States is insufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Because 
Schneider Canada did not take any deliberate steps at any time to serve the Utah market, 
the Gardners' stream of commerce theory of jurisdiction fails as a matter of law, as the 
trial court correctly held. 
2. Schneider Canada is not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction Under 
the Garders' Corporate Conglomerate Theory. 
The Gardners also argue specific personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is 
proper because Schneider Canada's parent, Square D, allegedly has "minimum contacts" 
in Utah, and because Schneider Canada is "part of a multi-national conglomerate." (Br. 
of Appellants at 20-23.) In essence, the Gardners are attempting to bootstrap Schneider 
Canada into this action by way of its affiliation with related corporate entities, including, 
but not limited to, Schneider Canada's parent company, Square D, and Square D's parent 
company, Schneider Electric. The Gardners' corporate conglomerate theory of 
jurisdiction has no support in the law. 
The Supreme Court has stated that jurisdiction over a parent corporation does not 
automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary. See Keeton, 465 
U.S. at 770. Jurisdiction over two related defendants is generally only proper if the 
requirements of Int'l Shoe are met for both. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980) 
(concluding that each corporation's contacts with the forum state must be assessed 
individually). 
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Schneider Canada, itself, does not have minimum contacts with the state of Utah, 
and imputing the contacts of its parent company, Square D, to Schneider Canada is 
unwarranted. As set forth above, Schneider Canada is a subsidiary of Square D. Square 
D is a subsidiary of Schneider Electric. Square D is not a defendant in this action and did 
not market, manufacture, construct, sell, or distribute the control box at issue. 
Accordingly, jurisdiction over Schneider Canada can only be judged on its own contacts 
with the state of Utah and must be determined based on an analysis of whether the due 
process requirements are met for Schneider Canada, not for Square D or Schneider 
Electric. 
The Gardners blur the distinction between Schneider Canada and related corporate 
entities in support of their corporate conglomerate theory of jurisdiction. They do so by 
commingling Schneider Canada with these related corporate entities (e.g., Square D) and 
various trade names (e.g., Telemecanique) and then labeling Schneider Canada as "part 
of a multi-national conglomerate." (Br. of Appellant at 22-23.) The Gardners claim that 
a Schneider Electric website that links to Square D's and Schneider Canada's websites is 
proof that the entities are essentially one in the same and should be treated as such for 
jurisdictional purposes. (Br. of Appellants at 22.) 
The Gardners, however, ignore the very case law upon which they rely to support 
the corporate conglomerate theory. That case law, which the Gardners cite on pages 20 
and 21 of their brief, requires them to demonstrate a basis for piercing the corporate veil 
before this Court may disgregard the separate and distinct identities of Schneider Canada, 
Square D, and Schneider Electric. To illustrate what a difficult burden the Gardners bear 
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in piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the corporate form for jurisdictional 
purposes, it is important to note that in only two of the seven cases the Gardners cite did 
the court actually find there was enough evidence to pierce the corporate veil of a related 
entity. In one such case, In re Cyclobenzaprine, 693 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D. Del. 2010), the 
court pierced the corporate veil based on evidence that the entities shared the same 
business address and some of the same employees. Id. at 420. The same cannot be said 
of Schneider Canada, Square D, and Schneider Electric. In another case, Patin v. 
Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 29A F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2002), the court pierced the 
corporate veil of a successor corporation that was a "mere continuation of its predecessor 
corporation." Id. at 654. Again, there are no facts here that Schneider Canada is a mere 
continuation of either Square D or Schneider Electric. In the other five cases cited by the 
Gardners, the courts found insufficient evidence to justify disregard of the corporate 
form.8 
Indeed, in those cases, the courts required much more of a connection to substantiate an 
alter ego relationship than what the Gardners allege here (i.e. links on websites, 
marketing similar brands, etc.). See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, 
674 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598-602 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that Mars Global and Mars 
Canada maintained distinct corporate entities and there was therefore no evidence of an 
alter ego relationship between the companies; also stating that "the level of control 
necessary to substantiate an alter ego relationship must exceed the usual supervision that 
a parent exercises over a subsidiary"); Harte-Hanks Direct Marketing/Baltimore, Inc. v. 
Varilease Tech. Fin. Group, 299 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514-15 (D. Md. 2004) (refusing to 
pierce the corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes because plaintiff could not show 
defendant used the corporate entities to perpetuate a fraud); Gordon v. Greenview Hosp., 
Inc., 300 S.W.3d 635, 653-54 (Tenn. 2009) (declining to disregard the corporate identity 
of parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes where plaintiff failed to allege that 
parent exercised complete control of subsidiary's internal affairs or daily operations); 
BMC Software Belgium, N. V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798-99 (Tex. 2002) (plaintiff 
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The Gardners do not even bother to set forth the standard for piercing the 
corporate veil in Utah, let alone present facts to satisfy the standard. In order to pierce 
the corporate veil in Utah, a plaintiff must meet the following two part test: 
(1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of 
one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
an inequitable result would follow. 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979) (emphasis 
added). It is not enough that the subsidiary corporation did not have a separate 
personality; a plaintiff must also show that the parent caused the subsidiary to be used to 
perpetrate a fraud. Baldwin v. Matthew R. White Inv., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1054, 1055-56 
(D.Utahl987).9 
failed to show parent controlled the internal business operations and affairs of the 
subsidiary, which is the showing required to "'fuse' the parent company and its 
subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes"); Hobbs v. Don Mealey Chevrolet, Inc., 642 So.2d 
1149, 1156-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the corporate veil cannot be pierced 
for jurisdictional purposes absent a showing of improper conduct, which plaintiff had 
failed to make). 
The Gardners do not seek to satisfy any of the veil-piercing tests enumerated in the cases 
they cite. For example, they do not claim Square D controlled Schneider Canada's 
internal business operations or affairs, or used Schneider Canada to perpetrate a fraud. In 
short, the Gardners have failed to allege any facts that would justify the application of the 
extreme remedy of veil-piercing. 
9
 Utah courts view piercing the corporate veil under an alter ego theory as a severe action 
that courts should undertake only rarely, in the most extreme circumstances. Compare 
Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1576 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("[Corporate veils exist for a reason and should be pierced only reluctantly and 
cautiously."). 
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Utah courts look primarily to the following factors to determine whether to 
disregard the corporate veil for jurisdictional purposes: 
(1) whether distinct and adequately capitalized financial 
units are incorporated and maintained; 
(2) whether daily operations of the two corporations are 
separate; 
(3) whether formal barriers between management of the 
two entities are erected, with each functioning in its own best 
interests; 
(4) whether those with whom the corporations come in 
contact are apprised of their separate identity; 
(5) whether the corporation was used as a fa?ade for 
operations of the dominant shareholder; and 
(6) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or 
fraud. 
Id. (citations omitted); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
An examination of the Gardners' alleged evidence shows none of those factors is 
present here. The exclusive basis of the Gardners' alter ego claims is the following: (1) 
"Schneider Electric owns an Internet website which has a link to Schneider Canada, 
Schneider Holdings, Square D, as well as other affiliates and markets"; (2) "[t]he 
Schneider Companies maintain an English-language website marketing the 
Telemecanique brand of product that was used . . . in the Control Panel"; (3) "[t]he 
Schneider Companies maintain scores of virtually identically websites geared towards 
marketing and selling their products"; (4) Schneider Electric's website produces "a list of 
16 distributors in Utah, one sales agent in Utah, and an electronic catalog of 
Telemecanique products"; (5) "Square D maintains an office in Utah, is registered as a 
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corporation in Utah, and has a registered agent in Utah"; and (6) "Schneider Electric was 
advertising for jobs in Utah . . . with EFI Electronics, which was another one of Square 
D's subsidiaries," prior to the district court's ruling granting Schneider Canada's Motion 
to Dismiss. (Br. of Appellants at 22.) 
Noticeably absent from the Gardners' brief are any allegations that either 
Schneider Electric or Square D treats Schneider Canada as its alter ego. For example, the 
Gardners do not allege that either Schneider Electric or Square D commingles funds with 
Schneider Canada, that either Schneider Electric or Square D controls the day-to-day 
operations of Schneider Canada, or that either Schneider Electric or Square D uses 
Schneider Canada as a fa9ade or to perpetrate a fraud. To the contrary, the record 
evidence shows Schneider Canada has its own Board of Directors, officers, managers, 
and employees, who are responsible for the day-to-day business operations of Schneider 
Canada. It establishes Schneider Canada is a wholly separate and autonomous business 
entity from that of Square D and Schneider Electric. Accordingly, there is no basis to 
pierce the corporate veil and disregard the corporate form for jurisdictional purposes. 
3* Balancing the Convenience of the Parties and the Interests of the 
State of Utah Dictates That the Court Should Not Assume 
Jurisdiction Over Schneider Canada. 
As set forth in Parry, when considering the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation, the courts "must also examine '|w]hether the cause of action arises out of or 
has a substantial connection with the activity [in the forum state] and [whether there was 
a] balancing of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the State in assuming 
jurisdiction.'" Parry, 779 P.2d at 662 (citing Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110). In making 
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this examination, there are "important differences between assertions of jurisdiction in 
the interstate context and those in the international context." Id. As Parry discusses, 
courts have recognized "the inconvenience placed upon international defendants when 
balanced against the forum state's interest in litigating the plaintiffs claims: 'The unique 
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should 
have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of 
personal jurisdiction over national borders.'" Id. (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 
(emphasis added)). 
There is no doubt Schneider Canada, as a Canadian corporation, "faces substantial 
inconvenience in litigating in a foreign forum." Parry, 779 P.2d at 668. Moreover, while 
Schneider Canada recognizes the "interests of the state to 'provide its citizens with an 
effective means of redress,'" in this case, this Court can successfully balance what 
appears to be conflicting interests. Id. Here—as opposed to other cases where the 
plaintiffs only redress lies against a foreign defendant—the Gardners tried their case 
against the defendant that manufactured the dock door leveler actually implicated in Mr. 
Gardner's death as well as the defendant that installed such dock door leveler. 
The fact that the Gardners had their redress against the other defendants in Utah 
Court balanced against the formidable inconvenience of Schneider Canada having to 
defend a lawsuit in a state where it does not have sufficient minimum contacts must lead 
to the conclusion that Schneider Canada should not be obligated to defend a case in this 
state where its contacts are "insignificant and insufficient to incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection.'" Parry, 779 P.2d at 668 (citations omitted). Placing 
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this large burden on Schneider Canada, given the lack of its minimum contacts here in 
Utah and the fact the Gardners brought in defendants from whom they could properly 
seek damages, clearly violates the due process clause and the notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
To conclude, the trial court correctly ruled the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over Schneider Canada does not comport with due process under either the Gardners' 
"stream of commerce" or "corporate conglomerate" theories. Moreover, the balance of 
the convenience of the parties weighs against exercising personal jurisdiction over 
Schneider Canada. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling granting 
Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
IIL THE GARDNERS' CLAIMS AGAINST SCHNEIDER CANADA ARE 
MOOT IN ANY EVENT BECAUSE THE JURY VERDICT AND 
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE JURY VERDICT COLLATERALLY 
ESTOP THE GARDNERS FROM PROVING ANY OF THEIR CLAIMS 
AGAINST SCHNEIDER CANADA, 
Even if this Court were to conclude the trial court's personal jurisdiction ruling 
was error, it should still affirm the dismissal of the claims against Schneider Canada 
because the record in the trial court demonstrates without question that those claims are 
moot. That is because the jury's findings in its special verdict exonerating SPX and HO J 
collaterally estop the Gardners from proving their claims against Schneider Canada.10 
Thus, reversing and remanding the dismissal of those claims would be futile, and the 
Court should not do so. See, e.g., Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, f^ f 130-137, 
10
 This Court should affirm the jury verdict and the trial court's resulting judgment for 
reasons co-appellees, SPX and HOJ, will explain in their briefs. 
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82 P.3d 1076 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim on alternative ground that jury verdict 
in trial below had destroyed an essential factual predicate for fraud claim, thus rendering 
claim moot and precluding reversal or remand); see also Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 16, 48 P.3d 968 ("[W]e will not adjudicate issues when 
the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed moot when the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, 
1J25, 16P.3dl233). 
Following the dismissal of Schneider Canada on jurisdictional grounds, there was 
a full-blown jury trial below, which resulted in a complete defense verdict in favor of 
SPX and HOJ. In its verdict, the jury specifically found the dock door leveler designed 
and sold by SPX did not contain a design defect that made the product unreasonably 
dangerous. This verdict necessarily encompasses Schneider Canada's control panel 
because the control panel was simply a component part of the end product—the dock 
door leveler. Therefore, even if the Court finds the trial court incorrectly ruled on the 
jurisdictional question as to Schneider Canada, the jury's verdict and the resulting 
judgment collaterally estop the Gardners from proceeding and recovering against 
Schneider Canada. 
In Utah, collateral estoppel "is a judicially-created doctrine that 'prevents parties 
or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully 
litigated in the first suit.'" Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, f 29, 232 P.3d 1059 
(internal citation omitted). To invoke collateral estoppel, a party must show the 
following elements: 
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(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to 
the one presented in the instant action; (2) the party against 
whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity 
with a party, to the prior adjudication; (3) the issue in the first 
action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the 
first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Id. Utah does not require mutuality of parties for collateral estoppel to apply. Nielson v. 
Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) (stating the "rule is that a stranger to a 
judgment may assert a judgment against one who actually litigated an issue that was 
necessarily decided by the judgment and thereby preclude the relitigation of the same 
issue"); see also Robertson v. Campbell, 614 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983) ("It is not 
necessary that the parties who assert collateral estoppel against one who lost the issue in a 
prior case were also parties to the first action."). Schneider Canada, therefore, is not 
precluded from invoking the collateral estoppel doctrine simply because it was dismissed 
early on in the underlying litigation and did not ultimately participate in the jury trial. 
The jury verdict and judgment based on the jury verdict preclude the Gardners 
from relitigating their design defect claims against Schneider Canada. Here, the second 
through fourth elements that are necessary to invoke collateral estoppel cannot be 
disputed: as to the second element, the Gardners were parties to the proceedings below; 
as to the third element, the issue of whether the dock door leveler contained a design 
defect was fully and fairly litigated through the jury trial; and, as to the fourth element, 
the jury trial resulted in a jury verdict and final judgment based on the jury verdict. Thus, 
the only element from Gudmundson that requires further analysis is the first element— 
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whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the 
instant action. 
Here, in the event the Court finds the district court incorrectly ruled upon the 
jurisdictional question, the remaining issues left to be litigated against Schneider Canada 
would be identical to the issue the Gardners already litigated and lost against SPX. One 
of the main issues the Gardners litigated through trial against SPX was whether the dock 
door leveler that allegedly caused Aaron Gardner's injury contained a design defect that 
made the product unreasonably dangerous. (R. 2269.) The jury found for SPX on this 
issue by concluding that the dock door leveler did not contain a design defect that made it 
unreasonably dangerous. (Id.) Because Schneider Canada's product, the control panel, 
was merely a component part of the dock door leveler, it is encompassed within the jury's 
verdict. In other words, the Gardners are collaterally estopped from relitigating whether 
Schneider Canada's control panel had a design defect because it is only a small piece of 
the overall product—the dock door leveler—that the jury already found to be not 
defective. 
In sum, the jury's finding that the SPX dock door leveler did not contain a design 
defect collaterally estops the Gardners from asserting that the Schneider Control Panel— 
which was merely part of that dock door leveler—was defective. Thus, regardless of the 
correctness of the trial court's jurisdictional ruling, this Court should decline to remand 
the Gardners' claims against Schneider Canada for further proceedings because those 
claims are moot. This result accords with well-established appellate jurisprudence in 
Utah countenancing against the revival and remand of claims that can no longer impact 
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the rights of the litigants. See, e.g., Jensen, 2003 UT 51, fflf 130-137 (affirming dismissal 
of fraud claim on alternative ground that jury verdict in trial below had destroyed an 
essential factual predicate for fraud claim, thus rendering claim moot and precluding 
reversal or remand); Brookside Mobile Home Park, 2002 UT 48, ^ 16 ("[W]e will not 
adjudicate issues when the underlying [claim] is moot. A [claim] is deemed moot when 
the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.") (quoting Ellis v. 
Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ^ 25, 16 P.3d 1233). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of the Gardners' claims against Schneider 
Canada. The trial court correctly dismissed Schneider Canada from this action for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and this Court should affirm that decision in all respects. 
Alternatively, the Gardners' claims against Schneider Canada are now moot because the 
jury verdict and resulting judgment exonerating SPX and HOJ collaterally estop the 
Gardners from asserting Schneider Canada's control panel was defective. Thus, 
reversing and remanding the claims against Schenider Canada for further proceedings 
would be futile, and the Court should not do so. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2010. 
^ ^ J ^ d ^ T . BLANCH 
^ ^ 2rACK L. WINZELER 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Schneider Canada, Inc. 
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881 JUDICIAL CODE 78B-3-201 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who dies may 
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence 
other than the testimony of the injured person. 
(3) This section may not be construed to be retroactive. 
2009 
78B-3-108. Shoplifting — Merchant's rights — Civil 
liability for shoplifting by adult or minor — 
Criminal conviction not a prerequisite for 
civil liability — Written notice required for 
penalty demand. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Merchandise" has the same meaning as provided 
in Section 76-6-601. 
(b) "Merchant" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 76-6-601. 
(c) "Minor" has the same meaning as provided in Sec-
tion 76-6-601. 
(d) "Premises" has the same meaning as "retail mer-
cantile establishment" found in Section 76-6-601. 
(e) "Wrongful taking of merchandise" has the same 
meaning as "retail theft" as described in Section 76-6-602. 
(2) A merchant may request an individual on his premises 
to place or keep in full view any merchandise the individual 
may have removed, or which the merchant has reason to 
believe the individual may have removed, from its place of 
display or elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase, or 
for any other reasonable purpose. The merchant may not be 
criminally or civilly liable for having made the request. 
(3) A merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise 
has been wrongfully taken by an individual and that the 
merchant can recover the merchandise by taking the individ-
ual into custody and detaining the individual may, for the 
purpose of attempting to recover the merchandise or for the 
purpose of informing a peace officer of the circumstances of the 
detention, take the individual into custody and detain the 
individual in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length 
of time. Neither the merchant nor the merchant's employee 
may be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false 
imprisonment, slander, or unlawful detention or for any other 
type of claim or action unless the custody and detention are 
unreasonable under all the circumstances. 
(4) An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise is liable in 
a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to 
the merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchan-
dise not to exceed $1,000, plus an additional penalty as 
determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than 
$500, plus court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
(5) A minor who wrongfully takes merchandise and the 
minor's parents or legal guardian are jointly and severally 
liable in a civil action to the merchant for: 
(a) actual damages; 
(b) a penalty to the merchant in the amount of the 
retail price of the merchandise not to exceed $500 plus an 
additional penalty as determined by the court of not less 
than $50 nor more than $500; and 
(c) court costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
(6) A parent or guardian is not liable for damages under 
this section if the parent or guardian made a reasonable effort 
to restrain the wrongful taking and reported it to the mer-
chant involved or to the law enforcement agency having 
primary jurisdiction once the parent or guardian knew of the 
minor's unlawful act. A report is not required under this 
section if the minor was arrested or apprehended by a peace 
officer or by anyone acting on behalf of the merchant involved. 
(7) A conviction in a criminal action of shoplifting is not a 
condition precedent to a civil action authorized under Subsec-
tion (4) or (5). 
(8) (a) A merchant demanding payment of a penalty under 
Subsection (4) or (5) shall give written notice to the person 
or persons from whom the penalty is sought. The notice 
shall state: 
"IMPORTANT NOTICE: The payment of any penalty 
demanded of you does not prevent criminal prosecution 
under a related criminal provision." 
(b) This notice shall be boldly and conspicuously dis-
played, in at least the same size type as is used in the 
demand, and shall be sent with the demand for payment 
of the penalty described in Subsection (4) or (5). 
(9) The provision of Section 78B-8-201 requiring that com-
pensatory or general damages be awarded in order to award 
punitive damages does not prohibit an award of a penalty 
under Subsection (4) or (5) whether or not restitution has been 
paid to the merchant either prior to or as part of a civil action. 
2008 
78B-3-109. Right to life — State policy — Act or omis-
sion preventing abortion not actionable — 
Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a de-
fense. 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public 
policy of this state to encourage all persons to respect the right 
to life of ail other persons, regardless of age, development, 
condition, or dependency, including all persons with a disabil-
ity and all unborn persons. 
(2) A cause of action may not arise, and damages may not be 
awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but 
for the act or omission of another, a person would not have 
been permitted to have been born alive but would have been 
aborted. 
(3) The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live 
birth of a person may not be a defense in any action, and may 
not be considered in awarding damages or child support, or 
imposing a penalty, in any action. 2008 
78B-3-110. Defense to civil action for damages result-
ing from commission of crime. 
(1) A person may not recover from the victim of a crime for 
personal injury or property damage if the person: 
(a) entered the property of the victim with criminal 
intent and the injury or damage occurred while the person 
was on the victim's property; or 
(b) committed a crime against the victim, during which 
the damage or injury occurred. 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not apply if the 
person can prove by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(a) his actions did not constitute a felony; and 
(b) his culpability was less than the person from whom 
recovery is sought. 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to any next-of-kin, heirs, or 
personal representatives of the person if the person is disabled 
or killed. 
(4) Subsections (1), (2), and (3) do not apply if the person 
committing or attempting to commit the crime has clearly 
retreated from the criminal activity. 
(5) "Clearly retreated" means that the person committing 
the criminal act has fully, clearly, and immediately ceased all 
hostile, threatening, violent, or criminal behavior or activity. 
2008 
PART 2 
NONRESIDENT JURISDICTION ACT 
78B-3-201. Title — Purpose. 
(1) This part is known as the "Nonresident Jurisdiction 
Act." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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©15-<*-ZUZ JUDICIAL CODE 882 
(2) It is declared, as a matter of legislative policy, that the 
ibiic interest demands the state provide its citizens with an 
fective means of redress against nonresident persons, who, 
irough certain significant minimal contacts with this state, 
cur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection, 
lis legislative action is necessary because of technological 
ogress which has substantially increased the flow of com-
erce between the several states resulting in increased inter-
tion between persons of this state and persons of other 
ates. 
(3) The provisions of this part, to ensure maximum protec-
>n to citizens of this state, should be applied so as to assert 
risdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent 
rmitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
mt to the United States Constitution. 2008 
B-3-202. Definitions. 
A.s used in this part: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, 
company, association, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this 
state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, 
or representatives in this state which affect persons or 
businesses within the state. 2008 
B-3-203. Sworn certificate of nonresident doing 
business here. 
1) Any nonresident person, other than insurance organi-
ions, doing business in this state in one or more places shall 
a sworn certificate with the Division of Corporations and 
nmercial Code. 
2) The certificate shall contain the name and address of 
manager, superintendent, or agent in this state upon 
Dm service of process may be had in any action arising out 
he conduct of the business. 2008 
5-3-204. Effect of failure to file certificate — Service 
of process upon nonresident. 
r
 a nonresident person doing business as provided in 
tion 78B-3-203 fails to file a certificate, or the manager, 
erintendent, or agent designated in the certificate cannot 
bund within the state, service of process may be made by 
ring any person employed by or acting as an agent for the 
resident. 2008 
1-3-205. Acts submitt ing person to jurisdiction. 
otwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, any person or per-
il representative of the person, whether or not a citizen or 
dent of this state, who, in person or through an agent, does 
of the following enumerated acts is subject to the juris-
ion of the courts of this state as to any claim arising out of 
slated to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 
located within this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate mainte-
nance, or child support, having resided, in the marital 
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subse-
quent departure from the state; or the commission in this 
state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act 
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over 
which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this 
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78B, 
Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act, to determine 
paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for 
child support. 2008 
78B-3-206. Service of process. 
(1) Service of process on any party outside the state may be 
made pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Service of summons and of a copy of the complaint, if 
any, may also be made upon any person located without this 
state by any individual over 21 years of age, not a party to the 
action, with the same force and effect as though the summons 
had been personally served within this state. No order of court 
is required. An affidavit of the server shall be filed with the 
court stating the time, manner and place of service. The court 
may consider the affidavit, or any other competent proofs, in 
determining whether proper service has been made. 
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to 
limit or affect the right to serve process in any other manner 
provided by law. 2008 
78B-3-207. Only claims arising from enumerated acts 
may be asserted. 
Only claims arising from acts enumerated in this part may 
be asserted against a defendant in an action in which juris-
diction over him is based upon this part. 2008 
78B-3-208. Default judgments . 
(1) A default judgment may not be entered until the expi-
ration of at least 30 days after service. 
(2) A default judgment entered on service may be set aside 
only on a showing which would be timely and sufficient to set 
aside a default judgment entered on personal service within 
this state. 2008 
78B-3-209. When exercisable. 
Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, jurisdiction 
established under this part may be exercised regardless of 
when the claim arose. 2008 
PART 3 
PLACE OF TRIAL — VENUE 
78B-3-301. Actions involving real property. 
(1) Actions for the following causes involving real property 
shall be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, 
or some part, is situated: 
(a) for the recovery of real property, or of an estate or 
interest in the property; 
(b) for the determination, in any form, of the right or 
interest in the property; 
(c) for injuries to real property; 
(d) for the partition of real property; and 
(e) for the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real 
property. 
(2) If the real property is situated partly in one county and 
partly in another, the plaintiff may select either of the coun-
ties, and the county selected is the proper county for the trial 
of the action. 2008 
78B-3-302. Actions to recover fines or penalties — 
Against public officers. 
(1) Actions to recover fines or penalties shall be tried in the 
county where the cause, or some part of the cause, arose. 
(2) If a fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed by statute is 
imposed for an offense committed on a lake, river, or other 
stream of water situated in two or more counties, the action 
may be brought in any county bordering on the lake, river, or 
stream opposite to the place where the offense was committed. 
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AMENDMENTS A m e n d . X I V , § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection,] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment-] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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A m e n d . XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be pa id j 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec- 5- [Power to enforce amendment,] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866; declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
to disqualify.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Sec- 2, [Power to enforce amendment ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
History: Proposed by Congress on February more than three-fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by March 30, 1870. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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Attorneys for Schneider Canada, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GINGER GARDNER, individually and as 
guardian of her minor child, SABRJLNA LYNN 
GARDNER; HEATHER ANN GARDNER; 
and JOSHUA LEE GARDNER,, 
Plaintiffs, 
v$. 
SPX CORPORATION; HO J ENGINEERING 
& SALES CO., INC., d/b/a DOCK & DOOR 
SERVICES, a Utah corporation; SCHNEIDER 
ELECTRIC HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, SCHNEIDER CANADA, INC., a 
Canadian Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-X„ 
Defendants, | 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
SCHNEIDER CANADA, INCS 
MOTION TO DISMISS PIAINTIFFS' 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
! JURISDICTION 
Case No. 040922873 
Judge Timothy R* Hanson 
(Originally assigned to Judge Leslie A, 
Lewis) 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant Schneider Canada, Inc/s ("Schneider 
Canada") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction ("Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss"). Opposition briefs to Schneider 
Canada's Motion to Dismiss were filed separately by Plaintiffs and Defendant SPX Corporation 
93&904 
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("Defendant SPX'*). Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc. ("Defendant HOJ") filed no 
responsive brief. Oral argument on the Motion was heard on January 25, 2007. The Court, 
having fully considered Schneider Canada's Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support, 
PlaintifFs Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant SPX's Memorandum in Opposition, 
Schneider Canada's Reply bricfe, and all of the exhibits and affidavits attached to the respective 
briefs and having heard oral argument of all the parties, makes the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Lawr 
NATURE OF CASE AND PARTIES 
1. In this action, Plaintiff alleges thai; on or about November 2, 2002, Plaintiffs 
decedent Aaron Gardner, in the course of his employment at the Sysco processing plant in West 
Jordan, Utah, was unloading his vehicle at loading dock door number 51 and that the ieveler on 
dock door number 51 apparently came down on him without warning, fatally crushing him. 
2. Plaintiff further alleges that the dock Ieveler installed at dock door number 51 was 
designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant SPX and installed by Defendant HOX 
3. As to Schneider Canada, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant SPX has identified 
Schneider Canada to be a party who is at fault for this accident; it has been alleged thai 
Schneider Canada sold to Defendant SPX a defective part, which Defendant SPX installed on its 
product that was sold and distributed and installed as Dock Door Number 51 at the Sysco West 
Jordan Facility, 
4. Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action against Defendant SPX and 
Schneider Canada: Negligence, Strict Liability, Failure to Warn, Breach of Express and Implied 
936590.4 2 
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Warranties, and Punitive Damages. Plaintiffs allege Negligence, Failure to Warn and Breach of 
Implied Warranties and Punitive Damages against Defendant HOJ. 
ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES 
1 Schneider Canada brings its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Schneider 
Canada is a Canadian Corporation with no place of business and no other significant presence in 
the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not do business in Utah. 
6. Schneider Canada asserts that while it manufactured a component part of the 
subject dock Icveler—specifically, the control box placed in the subject dock door levelcr—the 
marketing, design, manufacture, construction, distribution and sale of the subject control box 
occurred entirely in Canada. Schneider Canada asserts that "all communications regarding the 
design, manufacture, construction, distribution and sale of the control box took place between 
and amongst individuals in Canada. The sale of the control box was to a Canadian distributor for 
distribution to the Canadian division of defendant SPX Corporation's predecessor-in-intorest 
("Sereo)." 
7- As such, it is assorted, Schneider Canada—either in its general business practices 
or in its involvement regarding the component part of the subject dock door leveler—did not 
puiposefiilly avail itself of the privilege of doing business in the State of Utah. Accordingly, as 
Schneider Canada argues, jurisdiction is not proper. 
8. Plaintiffs argue, among other things per their memorandum, that personal 
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada is proper because Schneider Canada puiposefiilly designed, 
marketed and delivered the control box into the national stream of commerce through a 
93*590.4 3 
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0005/013 
distributor who markets and sells the component box throughout the United States and Utah. 
This, according to Plaintiffs, satisfies the due process requirements. Additionally, argue 
Plaintiffs, Schneider Canada is a billion dollar corporation with global reach, thus the burden 
placed on it to litigate this case in Utah is minimal when compared to flic Plaintiffs' burden in 
litigating in Canada, 
9, Defendant SPX Corporation similarly opposes Schneider Canada's Motion to 
Dismiss for the reasons set forth in its Memorandum in Opposition to Schneider Canada's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
10, Schneider Canada is cuixently incorporated under the Federal Laws of Canada 
and its principle place of business is 19 Waterman Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M4B 
1Y2. 
11, Schneider Canada's marketing, designing, manufacturing, construction, selling, 
and distributing of the subject control box at issue occurred entirely in Canada, 
12, Schneider Canada designed the subject control box from specifications provided 
by the Canadian division of Defendant SPX's predecessor, Serco. 
13, All communications regarding the marketing, design, manufacture, construction, 
and sale Of the control box at issue took place between and amongst individuals in Canada, 
including but not limited to representatives of Schneider Canada, representatives of Serco7s 
Canadian division, and representatives of Guillevin International, Inc. ("Guillevin 
International"), the Canadian distributor, 
936590.4 4 
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14. Schneider Canada negotiated the sale of the subject control box in Canada to 
Serco's Canadian division. 
15. Guillevin International sold the subject control box in Canada to Serco's 
Canadian division. 
16. Some control boxes purchased from Schneider Canada were, in turn, sold by 
Serco' s Canadian division to its affiliate in the United States. 
17. At the time of the marketing, design and manufacture of the subject control box 
and its sale to the Canadian distributor Outllevin International, Schneider Canada was aware that 
some control boxes would be installed in dock levelers for the United States market, but was not 
specifically made aware that the control box in question would be used in the State of Utah. 
18. Schneider Canada does not do business in the State of Utah; is not registered to 
conduct business in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada owns no property in the State of Utah, 
pays no taxes, has no employees, officers, or offices in the State of Utah, and has not had any 
continuous or systematic dealings with the State of Utah. None of Schneider Canada's 
shareholders reside in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not maintain telephone or 
facsimile listings within the State of Utah nor does it advertise in the State of Utah. Schneider 
Canada has not conducted any business, communicated, or caused communications to occur with 
any consumer in the State of Utah, nor do a substantial percentage of its sales derive from 
revenue generated from customers in the State of Utah. Schneider Canada does not render 
services to any customers in the State of Utah, 
936590A 5| 
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19. Schneider Canada is a subsidiary of Square D Company, a Delaware Corporation 
with its principal place of business in Palatine, Illinois. Square D Company is a legal entity 
separate and distinct from Schneider Canada. Square D Company did not market, design, 
manufacture, construct, sell or distribute the subject electrical component or any component of 
the dock leveler at issue in this litigation, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
20. Having reviewed the Pleadings, Defendant Schneider Canada's Motion to 
Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, its Memorandum and Replies in Support, Plaintiffs5 
Memorandum in Opposition, and Defendant SPX's Memorandum in Opposition, and all 
affidavits and exhibits thereto, and having heard oral argument of the parties, the Court finds that 
additional discovery is not required for the determination and resolution of the issue of whether 
this Court has personal jurisdiction over Schneider Canada* 
21. Schneider Canada is not conducting substantial and continuous local activity in 
the State of Utah sufficient to meet the requirements for this Court to confer general jurisdiction 
over Schneider Canada. 
22. With regard to specific jurisdiction^ while the facts in this case indicate that 
Schneider Canada's actions may fulfill one or some of the enumerated requirements set forth in 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-24 (West 2004)0** U t a h Long-Arm Statute"), the assertion of 
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada does not comport with the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider Canada does not have minimum contacts with Utah such that 
936590.4 5 
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the maintenance of the suit against it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. 
23. Schneider Canada's actions of manufacturing the control box in Canada in 
accordance to the specifications of the Canadian Division of Serco, and selling it to a Canadian 
distributor fot ultimate placement in Serco's dock Icvclers is not activity sufficient to show that 
Schneider Canada purposefully availed itself of conducting business in the State of Utah. 
24. Mere awareness on the part of Schneider Canada that some of the control boxes it 
manufactured would be placed in dock Icvelere to be sold and used in the United States market is 
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada in the State of Utah. 
25. The actions of Schneider Canada of placing the control box into the stream of 
commerce are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Schneider Canada 
26. Schneider Canada's relationship with Square D Company, does not establish 
jurisdiction over Schneider Canada, 
27. In light of the above findings, Defendant Schneider Canada is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
i. Defendant Schneider Canada, Inc's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth 
Amended Complaint Based on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED; 
ii. This case is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction solely as to Schneider 
Canada, Inc. 
9H599A 1 
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iii. All parties shall bear thejr respective costs and fees relating to this Motion to 
Dismiss. 
DATED this J J _ day of, / W \ \ 2007 
By: lf/^ 
'Timothy R. Hanson 
Third District Court Judge 
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Approved zspioxm: 
CATHERINE VENTI 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc, 
and Schneider Canada, Inc. 
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Approved as to form; 
ROBERT^ILCHRIST 
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & MORTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Approved as to form: 
JfflMf-~fcfr6tT 
KENNETH W.YEATES 7 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant SPX Corporation 
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Approved as to foim: 
JOSEPF 
j . JOYCE & ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co. 
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FILJB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Jur^r^: - .<-.( 
By. _^C 
JUN 1 6 2009 
SALT LAKE COoi.- i ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT DePut* Clerk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GINGER GARDNER, individually and 
as guardian of her minor children 
SABRINA LYNN GARDNER; 
HEATHER ANN GARDNER; 
and JOSHUA LEE GARDNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SPX CORPORATION; HOJ 
ENGINEERING &SALES CO., INC., 
dba DOCK & DOOR SERVICES, 
a Utah corporation; SCHNEIDER 
ELECTRIC HOLDING, INC., 
a Delaware Corporation; 
and JOHN DOES IX, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
CASE NO. 040922873 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Attached is the Special Verdict Form which applies to the above case 
Dated: June / ^ 2 0 0 9 
By the Court 
fer^ f 
Robert P. Faust 
District Court Judge 
Q9\ft Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f f 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. If you find that 
the evidence favors the issues by a preponderance, answer "Yes." If you find that the evidence is 
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find 
that the greater weight of the evidence is against the issue, answer "No." 
At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the 
same six on each question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each 
question that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and then 
advise the bailiff. 
1. Was Defendant SPX Corporation negligent in the design of its product? 
ANSWER: YES NO \ / 
If you answered "Yes" please aaswer Question No. 2. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip Question No. 2 and please proceed 
to Question No. 3. 
2. Was the negligence of Defendant SPX Corporation a proximate cause of Aaron 
Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
Please-proceed to Question No. 3. 
3. Did Defendant SPX Corporation manufacture and sell a product that contained a design 
defect that made the product unreasonably dangerous? 
ANSWER: YES NO \f 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 4. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, skip Question No. 4 and please proceed 
to Question No. 5. 
4. Was Defendant SPX's unreasonably dangerous product containing the design defect, a 
proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
2 
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Please proceed to Question No. 5. * 
5. Was Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door Services 
negligent as alleged by the Plaintiffs? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 6. 
If you answered "No" to Question No. 5, skip Question No. 6, but read the 
instructions following Question No. 6. 
6. Was the negligence of Defendant HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., d/b/a Dock & Door 
Services a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1 and No. 2 and/or answered "Yes" to 
Question No. 3 and No. 4 and/or if you answered "Yes" to Question No. 5 and 
No. 6, then proceed to Question No. 7. If you did not answer "Yes" to those 
Questions, then stop your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this 
verdict. 
If you answered "Yes" to either Question 2, 4 or 6, please proceed to Question 
No. 7. 
7. Was Sysco Intermountain Food Services, Inc. negligent as alleged by the Defendants? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 8. 
If you answered "No" skip Question no. 8 and please proceed to Question No. 9. 
8. Was the negligence of Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc. a proximate cause of Aaron 
Gardner's death on November 2, 2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
Please proceed to Question No. 9. 
Was Aaron Gardner negligent as alleged by the Defendants? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
3 
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If you answered "Yes" please answer Question No. 10. 
If you answered "No" skip Question No. 10 and proceed to Question No. 11. 
10. Was the negligence of Aaron Gardner a proximate cause of his death on November 2, 
2002? 
ANSWER: YES NO 
PleaseproceedtoQuestionNo.il •-
11. For each of the following parties you found to be negligent or made a unreasonably 
dangerous product and was a proximate cause of Aaron Gardner's death on November 2, 
2002, please state what percentage of fault that is attributable to that party. In other 
words, if you answered either Question No. 1 or No. 2 "No," and answered either 
Question No. 3 or No. 4 "No", then do not assign any percentage of fault to SPX 
Corporation. If you answered Question No. 5 or No. 6 "No", do not assign any 
percentage of fault to defendant HOJ. 
The total of those to who fault is assigned must equal 100%. 
A. SPX Corporation % 
B. HOJ Engineering & Sales Co., Inc., % 
C. Sysco Intermountain Food, Inc. % 
D. Aaron Gardner *~ % 
TOTAL: 100% 
If you did not assign a percentage of fault to either SPX Corporation or HOJ, then stop 
your deliberations and please have the foreperson sign this verdict. 
If you did assign a percentage of fault to either SPX or HOJ, please proceed to Question 
No. 12. 
12. What amount do you find that would fairly compensate Plaintiffs for the harm suffered 
by the death of Aaron Gardner. When making this decision, do not make a deduction 
from damages for any percentage of fault that you have assessed to Aaron Gardner and/or 
Sysco Intermountain Foods. The judge will make any necessary deductions later. 
ECONOMIC 
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a. Past Lost Wages 
b. Future Lost Wages 
c. Past Fringe Benefits 
d. Future Fringe Benefits 
e. Past Lost Household Services 
f. Future Lost Household Services 
TOTAL: 
NON-ECONOMIC 
A. Ginger Gardner 
B. Sabrina Gardner 
C. Heather Gardner 
D. Joshua Gardner 
TOTAL: 
DATED this l(f day of June, 2009. 
4 fl4jL^ 
FOREPERSON 
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